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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
The

appeals from the district court’s appellate decision reversing the

state

magistrate’s judgment

against Alejandra Maria

Ochoa

for

misdemeanor vehicular

manslaughter.

Statement

Of The

Facts

Alej andra Maria

Road
— p.
11

in

And Course Of The Proceedings
Ochoa

exited the parking lot 0f a convenience store onto

stopping. (Exhibits, pp. 133-34 (Trial Tr.,1 p. 237, L. 19

Canyon County without

241, L. 24

— p. 274,

),

137 (Trial

Tr., p.

254, L. 11

— p.

L. 19), 163-73 (Trial Tr., p. 358, L.

255, L.

8),

24 —p. 396,

140-42 (Trial

42

— p. 241,

(Trial Tr., p. 267, L. 11

14); State’s Exhibit 1.)

—

p.

L.

24

),

137 (Trial Tr.

The Victim died

— p.

354, L. 3).)

The

state

267, L.

The

(Exhibits, pp. 133-34

254, L. 11

— p.

255, L.

274, L. 19), 163-73 (Trial Tr., p. 358, L. 24

—

p.

8),

140-

396, L.

as a result of injuries he received in the crash.

(Exhibits, pp. 154-56 (Trial Tr., p. 323, L. 6

18

p.

T11, p.

L. 14); State’s Exhibit 1.)

Victim, driving a motorcycle, crashed into the side 0f Ochoa’s car.

(Trial Tr., p. 237, L. 19

Midway

—

p.

328, L.

8),

161-62 (Trial

Tr., p.

348, L.

charged Ochoa With misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter in

a complaint ﬁled October 23, 2018. (R., pp. 12-13.)

The

state

moved in limine t0 exclude from trial evidence of any drugs in the Victim’s

system and the presence 0f drugs 0n his person under I.R.E. 401 and 403.

At

1

the initial hearing

The

(R., pp. 43-46.)

0n the motion, the magistrate court excluded the evidence 0f heroin

transcripts prepared for the appeal

from the magistrate division

“Exhibits, p.,” With the particular transcript and page line
1

t0 the district court

They are cited in this brief as
numbers added in parentheticals.

are included in the record in the electronic exhibits ﬁle.

0n the Victim’s person, but deferred ruling 0n the evidence of methamphetamine
Victim’s system until

p. 37, L.

22 —

At

it

in the

could hear additional evidence. (Exhibits, pp. 54-55 (03/28/ 19

Tr.,

p. 38, L. 12).)

the second hearing

on the motion

in limine the prosecution argued there

was no

evidence that the Victim’s use was “tied t0 the cause 0fthe collision,” and therefore nothing
t0 suggest

it

would make any material fact more 0r less probable.

Tr., p. 20, Ls. 16-22).)

Moreover, because there was no connection to the collision the

evidence was unfairly prejudicial. (Exhibits,

2).)

The

state further

itself irrelevant

80 (04/23/19

p.

79 (04/23/19

Tr., p. 20, L.

22 —

p. 21, L.

argued that Whether the Victim could have avoided the collision was

because the Victim was put in the position of avoiding the collision only

because Ochoa violated the law
p.

(Exhibits, p. 79 (04/23/ 1 9

Tr., p. 24, L. 8

The defense argued

When

— p.

she entered the street Without stopping.

25, L. 11).)

that the evidence

of controlled substances in the Victim’s

system was relevant t0 show “how [he] could have avoided
steering” and “braking,” and t0

(04/23/19 Tr., p. 29, L. 18

—

show

p.

(Exhibits,

“his

this crash”

and “how he was

judgment was impaired.”

(Exhibits, p. 81

30, L. 6).)

DRE/accident reconstruction expert

Who

Ochoa supported her argument with

testiﬁed that

a

methamphetamine can impair “the

decision-making process,” including by distorting perception of time and distance.
(Exhibits, p. 85 (04/23/19 Tr., p. 44, L.

20 —

under the inﬂuence of methamphetamine
the drug in his system, but rather

the

DRE exam

is

p. 46, L. 2).)

However, whether someone

not determined by measuring the amount 0f

by performing “the standardized ﬁeld

or the evaluation.”

(04/23/19 Tr., p. 61, Ls. 1-11).)

is

sobriety tests and

(Exhibits, pp. 85 (04/23/19 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 3-24), 89

The Witness acknowledged

that

methamphetamine

impairment cannot be established by a toxicology report alone. (Exhibits,
T11, p. 59, Ls. 17-22).)

The Witness

important information about

unable to perform any
61, L. 12

—p. 62,

When

further

to the defense expert, another

was under

the inﬂuence

p. 51, L.

made

2

here, ﬁrst

—

p.

he was

that

89 (04/23/19

Tr., p.

L. 24).)

is

p. 52, L. 1).)

by

instead 0f toward

method of evaluating Whether someone

to look at the facts

the driver, and determine if the driver

TL,

methamphetamine and

of the Victim. (Exhibits,

According
a crash

88 (04/23/ 19

acknowledged that he did not have relevant and

the Victim ingested

tests or evaluations

p.

made

0f the crash, including interviewing

a bad choice. (Exhibits, pp. 86-87 (04/23/19

The Witness identiﬁed

three “bad choice[es]” the driver

by turning away from

trying t0 avoid the collision

it,

in

the

oncoming car

second by only applying the rear brake, and third by speeding.

(Exhibits, pp. 87-88 (04/23/19 Tr., p. 52, L. 2

—

p. 56, L. 9).)

However, the Witness was

unable t0 say “with a reasonable degree of certainty” that the Victim was impaired, only a
belief that

methamphetamine was a “contributing

factor” t0 the Victim’s reaction to

pulling her car in front of him. (Exhibits, pp. 88-90 (04/23/19 TL, p. 62, L. 25

—

Ochoa

p. 66, L.

1).)

The

state’s pathologist

and

its

accident reconstructionist also testiﬁed at the

hearing.

(Exhibits, pp. 94-98 (04/23/19 Tr., p. 80, L. 18

L. 25).)

The pathologist testiﬁed

death.

(Exhibits,

p.

94 (04/23/19

reconstructionist testiﬁed he

p.

97 (04/23/19

that

—

p. 91, L. 7; p. 92, L. 5

methamphetamine played no
Tr.,

p.

81,

Ls.

17-24).)

p. 99,

role in the Victim’s

The

state’s

was unable to determine ifthe Victim was impaired.

T12, p. 95, Ls. 6—10).)

—

accident

(Exhibits,

The magistrate

ﬁrst found that

none 0f the witnesses testiﬁed “they could say with

was or

a reasonable degree 0f certainty what the level 0f impairment

affected

by any substance

that

was found

(04/23/19 Tr., p. 104, Ls. 6-11).)

irrelevant.

in the Victim’s

blood “would just be speculation”

speculative nature any such testimony

its

(Exhibits, p. 100 (04/23/19 Tr., p. 104, Ls. 16-21);

prejudicial.

(Exhibits, p. 100

The court

(Exhibits, p. 100 (04/23/19 Tr., p. 104, Ls. 11-15).)

then ruled that because of

were

Therefore any testimony by the witnesses regarding

methamphetamine or other substances
and therefore

in the deceased’s blood.”

that actions

ﬂ

would be

unfairly

211$ Exhibits p. 108

(5/8/19 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 15-22).)

On March
including

(R., pp.

its

26, 2019,

Ochoa moved

to exclude certain witnesses for the state,

pathologist, Dr. Groben, because of the timing of revealing

Dr.

Tr., p. 8, L.

The prosecutor responded that Dr. Groben had been revealed

expert Witness, in a

17, L.

in discovery.

59-6 1 .) At the hearing counsel stated the defense had not received medical records

underlying the coroner’s report. (Exhibits, pp. 25-34 (3/28/19

19).)

him

25 —

December discovery

p. 18, L. 4).)

response.

p. 17, L.

as a Witness, but not an

(Exhibits, pp. 34-35 (3/28/19 TL, p.

Then, before the discovery deadline the

Groben was an expert Witness.

24 —

state

had clariﬁed

(Exhibits, p. 35 (3/28/19 T11, p. 18, Ls. 5-7).)

that

The

prosecutor also represented that the coroner’s report With the facts and data underlying Dr.

Groben’s opinion had been disclosed in December. (Exhibits, pp. 35 (3/28/19
Ls. 3-13), 37-38 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 20, L. 16

—

p. 21, L. 20),

39 (3/28/19

Tr., p. 18,

Tr., p. 22, Ls. 16-

19).)

The

by

parties disputed

the defense.

whether any medical records had been requested in discovery

(Exhibits, pp. 35-37 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 18, L.

20 —

p. 20, L. 9).)

Defense

counsel represented that in a discovery request from the prior
“speciﬁcally request[ed] a written

summary

November

the defense

or a report of any testimony that the State

intends to introduce pursuant t0 Rules 702, 703 0r 705 0f the Idaho Rules of Evidence,

including the witness’s opinions, the facts and data for their opinions and the witness
qualiﬁcations.” (Exhibits, pp. 40-41 (3/28/19 T12, p. 23, L. 18

The

trial

— p.

court read the request and stated, “I'm not seeing Where

which those might be based.”

ﬂ

24, L. 7);

it

R., p. 21.)

says the reports 0n

(Exhibits, p. 41 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 13-19).)

Defense

counsel argued that medical records are included in the “facts and data” because the
pathologist read and relied 0n those records. (Exhibits, pp. 41-42 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 24, L. 22

—

p. 25, L. 13).)

The

data did not include

all

trial

court rejected this argument, holding that requesting facts and

items reviewed, only the facts and data gleaned from those sources.2

(Exhibits, pp. 42-44 (3/28/19 Tr. p. 25, L. 12

The magistrate denied
the

trial

the court set the trial for

The

trial

—

meet the witnesses.

p. 39, L. 9).)

May

27, L. 11).)

the motion to exclude the state’s witnesses, but continued

for the defense t0 prepare to

(3/28/19 Tr., p. 38, L. 13

— p.

1.

court later extended the

(R., p. 71; Exhibits, pp.

Ochoa did not waive her speedy

trial rights,

(Exhibits, pp. 56-57 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 39, L. 6

trial

date t0

May 8.

55-56

— 40,

so

L. 15).)

(R., pp. 75, 79-80.)

After the hearing on the motion to exclude Witnesses, 0n

March

28, 2019,

Ochoa

ﬁled a discovery request and a motion for a subpoena duces tecum for medical records
regarding the Victim. (R., pp. 62-68.) The
p. 73.)

2

The

On

April

1,

trial

2019, the prosecution

state is required to

court granted the motion the next day. (R.,

moved

for permission to obtain the Victim’s

produce, on request, a “written

summary 0r report” of anticipated

expert testimony that “must describe the witness’s opinions, the facts and data for those
opinions, and the witness’s qualiﬁcations.” I.C.R. 16(b)(7).
5

medical records under HIPAA.

(R., pp. 77-78.)

obtain the medical records 0n April

On April

10, 2019,

4.

Ochoa ﬁled

The prosecution received

trial.

for a continuance of the

trial,

asserting she

(R., pp. 87-88.)

That same day the

state

had not

was unavailable

provided a discovery

response providing the Victim’s “medical record from his treatment

at St.

Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center as a result of the trafﬁc collision on April 26, 2018.”

1

order t0

(R., pp. 81-83.)

received the medical records and that her accident reconstruction expert
for the scheduled

its

(R., pp.

19-23 .)

At the hearing the defense changed the basis ofthe motion from not having received
the records, to having received

T11, p. 4, Ls.

12-19).3)

The

them too

state

until recently.

trial.

(Exhibits, p. 75 (4/ 1 8/ 19

pointed out that the defense had been aware 0f the

December but had made no

coroner’s reliance 0n the medical records since

them

prepare for

late to

(Exhibits, p. 76 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 9, L. 10

responded by asserting the timing of the

state’s

— p.

effort t0 obtain

11, L. 16).)

The defense

made

the timing of

discovery disclosures

the request for the medical records reasonable. (Exhibits, p. 77 (4/1 8/19 Tr., p. 13, L. 18

—

p. 15, L. 4).)

The

trial

court found that the coroner’s report had been disclosed in

that the Victim’s death

was no excuse

for not

was a known element of the charged

offense,

December and

and therefore there

knowing that the medical records could be relevant to the case before

they were requested. (Exhibits, p. 78 (4/18/19

Tr., p. 16, L.

21 — p. 17, L.

8).) In addition,

3

The toxicology report had not been produced because it was generated by an out 0f state
and the coroner’s ofﬁce was prohibited from releasing medical records it did not
generate. (Exhibits, pp. 76-77 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 11, L. 18 — p. 12, L. 20).) The state was in
lab

the process 0f obtaining the report from the lab
Ls. 8-14).)

itself.

(Exhibits, p. 77 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 12,

Ochoa had

asserted her speedy

trial rights

when trying

t0 exclude Dr.

Groben

as a witness

but expressed Willingness t0 waive the right (but not in fact doing so) once that strategy
failed

and she was asking for more time

to prepare to

(Exhibits, p. 78 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 9-19).)

shown good cause and
defendant.

that

no

The

t0 establish

0f trial preparation. (Exhibits,

p.

trial

court found that

actual waiver 0f speedy trial

(Exhibits, p. 78 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 17, L.

found that Ochoa had failed

meet Dr. Groben’s testimony

why

78 (4/18/19

20 —

at trial.

Ochoa had not

had been entered by the

The

p. 18, L. 2).)

trial

court also

the medical records were an important part

Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-17).)

The

trial

court denied

the motion for a continuance. (R., pp. 162-63.)

Five days

later, at

toxicology results,

testimony
p.

at the

the April 23 hearing

Ochoa renewed her request

hearing “highlights

t0

state’s

motion

in limine regarding

for a continuance, stating that Dr. Groben’s

Why the Defense

101 (4/23/19 Tr., p. 111, Ls. 8-14).)

Wished

on the

is

not prepared” for

trial.

(Exhibits,

Speciﬁcally, based on the testimony the defense

“g0 through those [medical] records, 99

66

speak With hospital

staff,”

and “get an

expert Witness that can evaluate not only the medical records, but Dr. Groben’s report that

is

based on those medical records.” (Exhibits,

The

state

nothing

p.

101 (4/23/19 Tr., p. 111, Ls. 19-24).4)

responded that the defense had Dr. Groben’s report in December, and “there’s

new here.”

(Exhibits, p. 102 (4/23/19 Tr., p. 112, Ls. 3-1 1).)

The

trial

court again

denied the motion ﬁnding no showing of “unfair surprise or anything like that or prejudice
that

way.” (Exhibits,

p.

102 (4/23/19

Tr., p. 112, Ls. 12-15).)

4

Ochoa ﬁled an afﬁdavit waiving her right to a speedy trial one day before the hearing.
(R., pp. 167-68.) The trial court acknowledged this waiver, including its timing. (Exhibits,

p.

102 (4/23/19

Tr., p. 112, Ls. 17-24).)

Ochoa again renewed

the motion to continue

0n the morning of trial, but

learned that the report contained the words “cannabinoid” and “alcohol.”

Ochoa’s

trial

the

and

trial

Tr., p.

—

114, L. 17

p.

116, L. 7).)

The

(Exhibits, pp.

court speciﬁcally faulted

trial

counsel for not working within the timelines and deadlines established for
pre-trial procedures,

and

that the court did not

have

to grant a continuance

merely because of a change in defense strategies 0r approach to the case. (Exhibits,

p.

105

that the toxicology report

had

(5/8/19 Tr., p. 125, Ls. 11-22).)

The prosecutor pointed out

been provided

soon as the prosecution obtained

lab

and

that

it

to the defense as

did not provide any meaningful information that

coroner’s report. (Exhibits, pp. 105-06 (5/8/19 T11, p. 126, L. 18

it

from the

establish that the report

was under

power and

the state’s

discovery obligations. (Exhibits, p. 107 (5/8/19
that the defense

was made aware of the

report

— p.

13

discovery of the report itself until

March

the

L. 8).)

Ochoa had

Tr., p. 135, Ls. 10-19).)

which included a synopsis 0f the toxicology

1,

control such that

by the December

out-of—state

was not disclosed by

In again denying a continuance the trial court ﬁrst found that

report,

time

day before, and had for the ﬁrst time

asserting that she received the toxicology report the

102-03 (5/8/19

this

it fell

failed t0

within

Second,

it

its

found

disclosure 0f the coroner’s

report, but the defense did not seek

28. (Exhibits, pp. 107-08 (5/8/19 Tr., p. 135, L.

10 — p. 136, L. 14).)
Dr.

L. 20).)

Groben testiﬁed

Dr.

at trial.

Groben was a

(Exhibits, pp. 153-63 (Trial Tr., p. 318, L.

forensic pathologist

(Exhibits, p. 153 (Trial Tr., p. 318, L. 23

—

p.

Who worked
319, L. 17).)

1

— p.

356,

for the coroner’s ofﬁce.

As

part 0f his

work

in

determining the Victim’s cause 0f death Dr. Groben reviewed the hospital records 0f the
Victim. (Exhibits, pp. 154-56 (Trial Tr., p. 322, L. 2

— p. 328,

L. 8).)

When the

state

asked

Groben what he had learned about the Victim’s

Dr.

injuries

from

his

review 0f the hospital

records, trial counsel objected that the question called for hearsay and asserted Ochoa’s

confrontation rights.

(Exhibits, pp. 156-58 (Trial Tr., p. 328, L. 12

prosecutor responded in part

by

by contending

the state

was

I.R.E. 703. (Exhibits, p. 158 (Trial Tr., p. 336, L. 5

The

trial

p.

336, L. 3).)

The

trying t0 elicit evidence allowed

— p. 339,

L. 11).)

court then invited counsel t0 ask questions in aid of the objections and the

(Exhibits, p. 158 (Trial Tr., p. 339, Ls. 14-25).) Dr.

responses.

—

Groben

testiﬁed, outside

the presence of the jury, that he reviews the medical record, if available, “0n every case

do.”

(Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p. 341, L. 21

—

p.

342, L. 4).)

He

does not do a

I

full

autopsy where there has been surgery “because they’ve already repaired everything” so he

would not be able

t0 identify the injuries. (Exhibits, p.

would be “malpractice”
what was there before
9).)

He

for

159 (Trial

Tr., p.

him not t0 have reviewed the medical records

[the surgeons] started.”

342, Ls. 4-9).)
“t0

It

know exactly

(Exhibits, p. 160 (Trial Tr., p. 344, Ls. 2-

considers medical records in cases Where there has been surgery “mandatory” and

“absolutely important” t0 determining the cause of death.

342, Ls. 9-17).)

The “best form of information he could get” about

was from the documentation kept by the doctors
(Trial Tr., p. 342, L.

The
testimony

trial

...

(Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p.

24 —

p.

the Victim’s injuries

“trying to save his life.” (Exhibits, p. 159

343, L. 7).)

court applied the standard in I.R.E. 703 and ruled that

it

would “allow

the

of Dr. Groben,” including testimony “through the records” about the injuries

the Victim suffered, because

it

would “help

(Exhibits, p. 160 (Trial Tr., p. 345, L. 18

— p.

the jury to understand the cause 0f death.”

346, L. 19).)

Dr.

that

Groben then testiﬁed

he inspected the Victim’s body and took pictures and

that

he reviewed the medical records t0 determine What injuries the Victim suffered.

(Exhibits, p. 161 (Trial TL, p. 348, L. 18

for

—

349, L. 13).)

p.

him t0 review the medical records because

He

stated

it

was “imperative”

“the medical doctors have done examination

and found What’s wrong” and that he needed t0 know What the doctors “found
(Exhibits, p. 161 (Trial Tr., p. 349, Ls. 14-23).)

from the medical records. (Exhibits,

injuries

2).)

p.

Dr.

Groben described the many injuries

35 1 L. 11 — p. 352, L.
,

11).) Dr.

p.

Dr.

Groben learned about

t0 the Victim. (Exhibits, pp.

The jury returned a
judgment 0f conviction.

—

p.

350, L.

161-62 (Trial

Tr.,

Groben concluded the Victim bled t0 death from severed

The cause 0f death was “blunt force trauma due t0 a motorcycle
of death was accident.” (Exhibits,

time.”

the Victim’s

161 (Trial Tr., p. 349, L. 24

(Exhibits, p. 162 (Trial Tr., p. 352, L. 12

arteries in the pelvic region.

at that

162 (Trial

p.

guilty verdict.

(R., p. 198.)

Tr., p.

p.

353, L. 16).)

accident,” and the

353, L. 21

(R., p. 197.)

—

— p.

“manner

354, L. 3).)

The magistrate court entered a

Ochoa ﬁled a timely notice of appeal

t0 the district

court. (R., pp. 199-202.)

On

appeal the district court reversed.

(R., pp. 237-51.)

The

district court ﬁrst

concluded that the magistrate had erred by excluding evidence of substances found in the
Victim’s toxicology report because such evidence

negligence. (R., pp. 241-44.)

It

was

relevant to prove comparative

next concluded the magistrate court erred by not granting

a defense continuance because 0f the timing 0f disclosure 0f medical records 0f the Victim

prejudiced the defendant. (R., pp. 244-45.) Finally
at trial

by allowing

it

concluded the magistrate had erred

the state’s pathologist to testify regarding his review of the medical

records. (R., pp. 246-50.)

The

state

ﬁled a timely notice of appeal.
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(R., pp. 253-55.)

ISSUES
Did the district court err When it concluded that evidence of the Victim’s
toxicology screen was relevant and admissible to prove comparative negligence because
comparative negligence is itself irrelevant and the evidence was speculative?
1.

Did the district court err when it reversed the trial court for denying Ochoa’s
2.
motion for a continuance Where Ochoa’s trial counsel made the tactical choice t0 try and
exclude Dr. Groben’s testimony rather than prepare t0 meet it at trial, and therefore did not
request medical records to meet that testimony until only a few weeks before

claimed to be unprepared for
3.

Did the

trial

and then

because she did not have the records earlier?

district court err

0n appeal by employing an incorrect admissibility

standard and failing to recognize the magistrate’s scope of discretion

Groben, a pathologist Who

trial

determined the Victim’s cause 0f death,

to testify about the Victim’s injuries underlying his determination

11

When

it

held that Dr.

was improperly allowed
of the cause 0f death?

ARGUMENT
I.

The

A.

When It Concluded That Evidence Of The Victim’s Toxicology
Screen Was Relevant And Admissible To Prove Comparative Negligence

District

Court Erred

Introduction

Without addressing the magistrate’s ﬁnding that the connection between the

methamphetamine

in the Victim’s

blood and the cause of the accident 0r his death was

speculative, the district court reasoned that because the defendant’s negligence in causing

the death of the Victim

was

relevant the Victim’s contributory negligence

and therefore the evidence 0f methamphetamine
241-44.) This reasoning
as a matter of law.

is

ﬂawed.

First,

in his

was

also relevant

system was admissible.

contributory negligence

(R., pp.

by the Victim is irrelevant

Second, any connection between methamphetamine in the Victim’s

system and the cause of the accident 0r his death
speculative connection between

is

purely speculative.

Third, given the

methamphetamine and the accident or the Victim’s cause

0f death the magistrate did not abuse his discretion t0 exclude the evidence as unfairly
prejudicial.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“This Court reviews challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse

0f discretion standard.” Perry V. Magic Valley Reg‘l Med.
816, 820 (2000).

Ctr.,

134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d

“Trial courts maintain broad discretion in admitting and excluding

evidence.” State V. Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 487, 447 P.3d 930, 935 (2019)

An exception t0 this broad discretion is relevance,
subject to free review.”

Evidence

is

Which

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 774,

relevant if it has “any tendency” to

12

is

“a matter of law that

is

419 P.3d 1042, 1072 (2018).

make a fact “0f consequence in determining

the action,”

material

is

“more 0r

less probable.”

determined by

State V. Garcia,

_

Idaho

its

I.R.E. 401.

“Whether a

fact is ‘of

consequence’ 0r

relationship t0 the legal theories presented

_,

_

P.3d

by

_, N0. 46253, 2020 WL 2029266,

the parties.”

at

*4 (Idaho

Apr. 28, 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

“Even relevant evidence may be excluded by the
is

substantially

outweighed by a danger 0f

9, 16,

unfair prejudice[.]’”

I_d.

“A lower court’s determination under I.R.E. 403

quoting I.R.E. 403).

0n appeal unless

district court if ‘its

it is

shown

407 P.3d 596, 603

(Ct.

t0

be an abuse of discretion.” State

V.

probative value

(brackets original,

will not be disturbed

Hernandez, 163 Idaho

App. 2017).

“On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while

acting in

its

intermediate

appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.”

Recovery

Servs.,

LLC V.

Bonneville Billing

& Collections, Inc.,

Med.

157 Idaho 395, 397, 336

P.3d 802, 804 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). The appellate court “‘reviews the
court (magistrate) record t0 determine Whether there

to support the magistrate’s

is

substantial

trial

and competent evidence

ﬁndings 0f fact and Whether the magistrate’s conclusions 0f law

follow from those ﬁndings’” and then afﬁrms or reverses the district court based on that
determination. Shepherd V. Shepherd, 161 Idaho 14, 17, 383 P.3d 693, 696 (2016) (quoting

Losser

C.

V. Bradstreet,

The

145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)).

District Court

Employed An Erroneous Legal Standard

In Reversing

The

Magistrate Court

Misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter
in

which the operation 0f a motor vehicle

because of

[t]he

is

is

“the unlawful killing 0f a

human being

...

a signiﬁcant cause contributing to the death

commission of an unlawﬁll

13

act,

not amounting t0 a felony, Without

gross negligence.”

LC.

18-4006(3)(c);

§

ﬂ alﬂ

LC.

§

This statute

18-4007(3)(c).

requires the “culpable mental state of at least simple negligence.”

State V.

McNair, 141

Idaho 263, 267, 108 P.3d 410, 414 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that defendant’s theory that

he crossed over the center lane because he

hit a

patch 0f

ice, if

accepted by jury, would

Under

validly negate the mental state element for vehicular manslaughter).

construct the only conceivable relevance 0f the toxicology evidence

this statutory

was

to

Ochoa’s

negligence or whether her negligence was a signiﬁcant cause contributing to the Victim’s
death.

The evidence
First, the

in the toxicology report

was

relevant t0 neither.

toxicology report was not relevant to Whether

Ochoa pulled into the

street

without stopping 0r yielding. (State’s Exhibit

0r absence of controlled substances in the Victim’s blood

more nor

less likely.

It is

in a criminal action.”

Ochoa was
1.)

negligent.

The presence

made Ochoa’s negligence neither

well established that “contributory negligence

State V. Long, 91 Idaho 436, 443,

[is]

not a defense

423 P.2d 858, 865 (1967).

Therefore, “the theory of contributory negligence has no part” in a vehicular manslaughter

case.

I_d.

at

444, 423 P.2d at 866. Whether the Victim

was negligent

for driving With

some

degree ofmethamphetamine in his system was not relevant to whether Ochoa was negligent
for failure to yield.

Second, the mere presence of substances in the Victim’s blood as shown by the
toxicology report was not relevant to causation.

liability,

“‘To relieve a defendant of criminal

an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.’”

Thompson

V. State,

164 Idaho 821, 826, 436 P.3d 642, 647 (2019) (quoting State

V.

Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 375, 223 P.3d 750, 758 (2009)). Thus, the “defendant remains
criminally liable

if

either

the

possible

consequence might reasonably have been

14

contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that
could result from his act.” Li. (quotation marks omitted). T0 be superseding, a cause must

be “an independent act or force that breaks the causal chain between the defendant’s
culpable act and the Victim’s injury.” Li. (quotation marks omitted).
In this case the “possible consequence” of an accident “might reasonably have been

contemplated” and “the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm ofthe kind”
that resulted

from her

act

0f failing t0

Evidence of the presence 0f substances in the

yield.

Victim’s blood did not, alone or in combination with any evidence proffered

tend to

show that an accident causing a death was not a foreseeable consequence 0f Ochoa’s

failure to yield.

The excluded evidence did not tend

that breaks the causal chain

and was thus

evidence

t0

show “an independent

between the defendant’s culpable

act

act 0r force

and the Victim’s injury”

irrelevant.

Moreover, even
this

by Ochoa,

made

it

if

of some relevance, the amount of speculation associated with

unfairly prejudicial. Certainly painting the Victim as a

from the jury, and invited

the potential to invite an emotional rather than a rational response

mere speculation about how the Victim was responsible
errant behavior With drugs.

for his

Because the probative value was,

meth user had

own

death because 0f his

if anything,

minimal While

the potential prejudice of speculation about the actions of the meth-using Victim

the magistrate correctly

employed

his discretion

was

great,

and excluded the proposed evidence 0f

controlled substances in the Victim’s system.

Because the magistrate’s ruling regarding relevance was legally correct and
excluding the evidence for unfair prejudice was within

by reversing

the magistrate’s ruling.

The

its

discretion, the district court erred

district court ﬁrst

15

concluded that because

Ochoa’s negligence was relevant, then the Victim’s comparative negligence of driving with
controlled substances in his system

cited

n0 authority

contrary.

m,

was

The

also relevant. (R., pp. 241-42.)

for this conclusion, however.

(R., pp. 241-42.)

The

district court

authority

is

91 Idaho at 443-44, 423 P.2d at 865-66 (“contributory negligence

a defense in a criminal action”). Although the standard of comparative negligence

in fact

[is]

not

makes

sense in the civil context of establishing the dollar amount 0f a defendant’s liability along
a sliding scale,

it

makes no sense

in the binary

world of guilty or not guilty in the criminal

context. In neither area 0f law does one person’s negligence

not negligent, and negligence

the defendant

by

is

show that another person was

enough alone

t0

meet the mental

state

element of the crime. Because the Victim’s negligence did not show that Ochoa was not
negligent, the magistrate correctly held that evidence of the Victim’s toxicology report

irrelevant,

and the

district court erred

by reversing the

correct ruling

on a

was

legally erroneous

theory.

The

district court also

t0 causation.

concluded the evidence of the toxicology report was relevant

The court reasoned

(R., pp. 242-44.)

that the jury should

consider “all factors that might have led to the Victim’s death.”

analysis fails

0n both the magistrate’s

The magistrate found

that

factual

be allowed to

(R., pp. 242-43.)

ﬁndings and the applicable law.

Ochoa’s attempts

t0 establish a connection

between the

Victim’s toxicology report and the accident 0r the death through expert testimony

speculative.

(Exhibits, p.

100 (04/23/19

This

Tr., p.

104, Ls.

11-15).)

was

This ﬁnding was

supported by the record because the experts did not say that the presence of controlled
substances in the Victim’s system

was connected to

degree ofcertainty. (Exhibits,

100 (04/23/19

p.

16

the accident or death with a reasonable

Tr., p. 104, Ls. 6-1 1).)

“An expert opinion

that

merely suggests

may be

possibilities,

properly excluded.”

and not

Slack

probabilities,

V. Kelleher,

would only

invite conjecture

and

140 Idaho 916, 923, 104 P.3d 958, 965

(2004). “Testimony that amounts t0 speculation 0r conj ecture

is

not relevant and therefore

not admissible.” State V. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 563, 328 P.3d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 2014).

The

district court’s

reasoning that anything that “might have” contributed to the Victim’s

death was admissible failed t0 address (much less refute) the district court’s ﬁnding that
the proffered evidence

was

“might have” evidence

is

The magistrate

speculative and

is

inconsistent with the law that speculative

irrelevant.

correctly concluded that Ochoa’s proffered evidence trying t0

connect the presence 0f controlled substances in the Victim’s blood to the accident 0r his
death was speculative, and that speculative evidence
not address the magistrate’s ﬁnding the evidence

is

inadmissible.

was

speculative,

The

much

evidence was not speculative, but instead held that speculative evidence
district court’s ruling is

district court

is

less

show

admissible.

did

the

The

erroneous on the facts and the law.

Even if evidence 0fthe presence 0f controlled substances
relevant despite being speculative, the magistrate did not abuse

the evidence as prejudicial.

in the Victim’s

its

discretion

blood were

by excluding

In reversing, the district court again did not address the

magistrate’s ﬁnding that the connection between the evidence and the accident and death

was

speculative.

(R., pp. 243-44.)

The

district court

reasoned that excluding evidence 0f

toxicology results “limited the jury’s consideration t0 only Ms. Ochoa’s conduct

determining Whether the state met
pp. 243-44.)

and allowed

This

is

demonstrably

its

burden 0f proof” as t0 the causation element.

false,

When
(R.,

however, as the jury was presented evidence 0f

t0 consider the Victim’s actions, including that
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he was speeding and When and

how he

braked. (Exhibits, pp. 206-19 (Trial Tr., p. 528, L. 8

that the Victim

— p.

581, L. 24).5) Evidence

was speeding because ofmethamphetamine, and Whether he braked slowly

or ineffectively because 0f methamphetamine,

n0 more probative than evidence the

is

Victim was speeding and braked slowly and ineffectively. Although

and reacted
causation,

the

t0

Ochoa’s

failure t0 yield the right

of

way was

why the Victim drove and reacted the way he

why “might have been” methamphetamine was

probative value to the evidence,

its

did

how the

Victim drove

relevant and probative 0f

was not (and the testimony that

speculative).

potential prejudice in the

Even

if there

were some

form ofjury speculation and

negativity toward the Victim because 0f his drug use placed this evidence squarely within

the

trial

court’s discretion t0 exclude

The

district court’s

it

under I.R.E. 403.

decision 0n intermediate appellate review ignored the

court’s preliminary factual ﬁndings

trial

and applied an erroneous legal standard. Application

0f the correct legal standards shows no error by the

trial court.

The

district court

must be

reversed.

II.

The

A.

District

When It Concluded That The Trial Court Abused Its
BV Denying Ochoa’s Motion For A Continuance

Court Erred

Introduction

Ochoa requested the
The

5

Discretion

state,

Victim’s medical records

which did not have the records,

The defense accident

on March 28, 2019.

initiated the process

(R., pp. 62-68.)

of obtaining those records

motion, that the Victim could

abandoned the theory, presented in the pre-trial
have avoided the accident by steering toward Ochoa’s car,

and thus have passed behind

when

theory at

trial.

reconstructionist

(Compare

it

she continued to

move

forward,

Exhibits, pp. 206-19 (Trial Tr., p. 528, L. 8

— p.
18

581, L. 24).)

ﬂ

by not presenting this
— p. 52, L. 14)

Exhibits, pp. 86-87 (4/23/19 TL, p. 51, L. 16

shortly thereafter.
10th

(R., pp. 77-78, 81-83.)

oprril, 28 days before

for a continuance based

Ochoa was

trial.

The

state

(R., pp. 119-23.)

produced the medical records on the

The

trial

court denied Ochoa’s request

0n the timing 0f the disclosure 0f the medical records because

responsible for most 0f the delay and because she had failed to establish any

prejudice. (R., pp. 162-63; Exhibits, pp. 78 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 16, L. 21

The

(4/23/19 Tr., p. 112, Ls. 12-15).)

continue the

trial,

made

the

day of the

day before. (Exhibits, pp. 107-08 (5/8/19
court found that the report

was not

control and that the delay until

107-08 (5/8/19
results

Tr., p. 135, L.

102

p. 18, L. 17),

denied the renewed motion to

district court also

trial

—

based on receipt of the toxicology report the

Tr., p. 135, L.

10

—

subject t0 discovery because

March 28 was

it

was not

attributable to the defense.

10 — p. 136, L. 14).) The

trial

0f the toxicology report were not admissible under

The

p. 136, L. 14).)

trial

in the state’s

(Exhibits, pp.

court also clariﬁed that the

its

prior ruling. (Exhibits 108

(5/8/19 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 15-22).)

In reversing, the district court ﬁrst concluded that the fact that the delay

defense’s fault did not matter if the defense

was unprepared

for

trial.

was

(R., p. 244.) It

the

then

found that Ochoa had been prejudiced by obtaining the toxicology report the day before
trial

because

it

was unprepared

prongs of its analysis.
late in the

discretion.

lack of

trial

common

for

trial.

(R., pp. 244-45.)

First, the fact that the

district court’s ruling that the

preparation

sense.

is

properly laid

Second, the

abuse of discretion.

district court erred in

both

defense did not request the documents until

process was properly considered

The

The

by

the trial court

defense

at its

own

is

when

it

exercised

entitled t0 a continuance

law and

about prejudice does not show an

Moreover, the inadmissibility of the toxicology evidence,
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When the

feet is contrary t0 established

district court’s speculation

its

set forth

Ochoa was

above, establishes the district court’s error in concluding

entitled to

a

continuance t0 review the toxicology report.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The “decision
the

trial

court.”

t0 grant or

rests Within the

State V. Daly, 161 Idaho 925, 927, 393 P.3d 585,

marks omitted). Review
(1) “correctly

deny a continuance

for an abuse

sound discretion of

587 (2017) (quotation

of discretion consists of determining

if the trial court:

perceived the issue as one 0f discretion”; (2) “acted within the outer

boundaries of its discretion”; (3) “acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the speciﬁc choices available t0

it”;

and (4) “reached its decision by the exercise ofreason.”

In Interest of Doe, 164 Idaho 143, 146,

426 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2018) (quotation marks

omitted).

C.

The District Court’s Appellate Ruling That The Magistrate Abused His Discretion
In Denying The Motion To Continue Is Contrary To Applicable Precedent
“This Court has held that where the denial of a motion to continue

is

attacked on

the basis of late disclosure 0r discovery 0f evidence, the alleged tardiness of the disclosure

must be shown t0 so prejudice the defendant’s case preparation that a fair trial was denied.”
State V. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255,

899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995).

129 Idaho 386, 389, 924 P.2d 1230, 1233

(Ct.

must be shown

0r her case that a fair

trial

a denial 0f a continuance

to

have been so prejudicial

was denied”). “There

is

also State V. Canelo,

App. 1996) (“Where the

discovery of evidence forms the basis for a request for
disclosure

E

are

relief,

late disclosure or

the alleged tardiness of the

t0 the defendant’s preparation

no mechanical tests

so arbitrary as to Violate due process.

for deciding

of his

when

The answer must be found

in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented t0 the trial

20

judge

at the

time the request

N0. 47534, 2020

WL

is

denied.” Interest of Doe

1887805,

at

*10 (Idaho Apr.

16,

Idaho

I,

_,

_

P.3d

2020) (quotation marks omitted).

“[U]nless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced

by reason of

a denial 0f his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there

no abuse ofdiscretion.”

State V.

must show a reasonable probability

outcome 0fthe trial would have been different.”

726, 728, 979 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999).

could have been conducted

is

a motion for a continuance.”

Pe_c0r,

m,

at

State V. Johnson, 132 Idaho

(Ct.

255, 899 P.2d at 965.

App. 1998) (“Prejudice

that additional investigation 0r testing could

E
is

alﬂ

m

not established

have been conducted”).

that additional investigation could

conducted. (Exhibits, pp. 102-03 (5/8/19 Tr., p. 114, L. 17
to

but for the late

A “bare claim that additional investigation

127 Idaho

Here Ochoa’s claim was merely

had months

that,

not sufﬁcient t0 demonstrate unfair prejudice so as to support

132 Idaho 359, 364, 972 P.2d 737, 742

by a mere claim

was

Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202, 485 P.2d 144, 146 (1971). Thus,

“to prove prejudice, a defendant

disclosure, the

_,

— p.

have been

117, L. 7).) Moreover, she

conduct that investigation after being made aware that Dr. Groben had

reviewed the medical records and toxicology report and concluded that controlled
substances in the Victim’s system did not cause or contribute t0 his death.

conducting that investigation, requesting that the

state

Instead of

produce the medical records and

toxicology report, or moving t0 compel the state to produce the report,6 the defense chose

6

Trial counsel repeatedly argued that the state

and reports reviewed by Dr. Groben
underlying that opinion.

(m, gg,

was required

in response to its

t0

produce

all

medical records

request for the “facts

Exhibits, pp. 26-27 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 9, L.

1

and data”

— p.

27, L.

— p. 25, L. 13).) The trial court rejected this argument,
11), 41-42 (3/28/19 Tr., p. 24, L. 22
holding that requesting facts and data did not include all items reviewed, only the facts and
data gleaned from those sources. (R., pp. 42-44 (3/28/19 Tr. p. 25, L. 12 — p. 27, L. 11).)
The applicable rule requires

the state t0 produce,
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0n request, a “written summary or report”

to wait

months and then moved

failure t0 speciﬁcally identify

to exclude Dr.

him

Groben

who

(the pathologist

as a witness, based

on the

state’s

prepared the coroner’s report) as

an expert. As found by the trial court, any lack ofpreparation regarding the medical records

and toxicology report was because of defense counsel’s
105 (5/8/19

is

App. 1985).

trial.

that

p.

indistinguishable from State V. Hansen, 108 Idaho 902, 702 P.2d 1362

In that case a report related t0 the examination of

physical evidence (cloth from the Victim’s panties)

t0 trial

(E Exhibits,

T12, p. 125, Ls. 11-22).)

This case

(Ct.

tactical choice.

and the defense moved

Li. at 903,

702 P.2d

motion included

at

was not disclosed until

state’s

three days prior

t0 either exclude the state’s expert Witness or continue the

1363.

The

(1) that the state

report; (2) the defense

some of the

facts

showing no abuse 0f discretion

provided the report “the same day”

“had several months before

into the evidence; (3) the defense “did not

trial t0

conduct his

own

it

in

denying

received the

investigation”

make an offer ofproof disclosing what additional

independent testing would establish”; and (4) there was n0 “contention in the record—let
alone any evidence—that the expert misidentiﬁed the piece of cloth as having
the Victim’s panties.” Li. at 904, 702 P.2d at 1364.

As

in

Hanson, the

come from

state (1) disclosed

the medical records and toxicology report as soon as the prosecution acquired them; (2)

Ochoa had

several

months

t0 conduct her

own

investigation; (3)

Ochoa made no

offer 0f

proof regarding what evidence might result from a continuance; and (4) there was no

0f anticipated expert testimony that “must describe
the facts and data for those
opinions.” I.C.R. 16(b)(7) (emphasis added). Ochoa’s discovery request incorporated the
language 0f the rule. (R., p. 21.) A motion t0 compel would therefore have failed. But
defense counsel

made

months before acting on what she
was an incomplete discovery response, and then only to try to get

the tactical decision t0 wait

represented she believed

the state’s evidence excluded.

22

contention—let alone any evidence—that Dr. Groben had inaccurately identiﬁed the
Victim’s death as being the result 0f the collision with Ochoa’s car.

support the

trial

court’s exercise 0f discretion.

In concluding otherwise, the district court ﬁrst stated that

any

“fault in the late disclosure”

materials. (R., p. 244.)

(R., p.

245

The law and the record

It

(m m,

and looked only

at the

its

analysis disregarded

timing of defense acquisition of the

then applied the prejudice standard applicable to late disclosures.

127 Idaho

delay efforts t0 acquire materials

it

at

255, 899 P.2d at 965).) Concluding that a party

deems necessary

for trial preparation for

months and

then claim that the late acquisition of those materials requires a continuance so that
investigate the signiﬁcance of those materials

is

contrary to precedent.

m,

127 Idaho

that additional investigation could

at

is

truly extraordinary.

at

742 (“Prejudice

is

it

may

importantly,

have been conducted

is

not sufﬁcient to demonstrate

m,

132 Idaho

at

364,

not established by a mere claim that additional investigation

or testing could have been conducted”).

The

parties’ actions in acquiring 0r disclosing

evidence are certainly relevant t0 a court’s exercise of discretion. Hansen, 108 Idaho
903-04, 702 P.2d at 1363-64.
disregarded the

trial

it

255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995) (a “bare claim

unfair prejudice so as t0 support a motion for a continuance”);

972 P.2d

More

may

The

district court erred

When

court’s determination that defense counsel

it

at

simply and improperly

made

the tactical choice t0

not pursue the production of the medical records and toxicology report until after she failed
t0 get Dr.

Groben’s testimony excluded.

Because

this district court

simply disregarded

legally relevant factual ﬁndings supporting the trial court’s exercise 0f discretion,

In addition, the district court’s prejudice analysis

concluded that

trial

is

ﬂawed.

counsel did not have “sufﬁcient time t0 prepare for

23

The

it

erred.

district court

trial” after receipt

0f the medical records because the Victim’s “medical condition was considerably more
complicated” because of the presence of controlled substances, and therefore not granting
a continuance “invites an automatic Idaho Criminal Rule 35
result is not favorable.”

prejudice

is

(R., pp. 244-45.)

[sic]

motion When the

[trial]

In addition t0 the error of concluding that

the only applicable standard, this prejudice analysis does not Withstand

scrutiny.

The
ruling

district court’s analysis

here

is

ﬂawed by the same

on the admissibility of toxicology evidence

ﬁrst issue, above.

“T0

error

made

in relation to

its

to attack causation, as addressed in the

relieve a defendant 0f criminal liability, an intervening cause

must

be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence” that “breaks the causal chain between
the defendant’s culpable act and the Victim’s injury.”

P.3d

at

Thompson, 164 Idaho

647 (quotation marks omitted). Ochoa “remains criminally

at 826,

436

liable” if “the possible

consequence” of the Victim’s death “might reasonably have been contemplated” or
“foreseen.”

Li. (quotation

marks omitted). Although

it is

possible that presence 0f the

controlled substances “complicated” medical efforts to save the Victim’s

this record suggests the Victim’s

records and toxicology report

failure to yield

is

at

would have broken

to believe that

would have yielded evidence

nothing in

drug use or other matters within the scope of the medical
the “causal chain” between the Ochoa’s

and the Victim’s death, 0r would have rendered

mere speculation

life,

that death unforeseeable.

It

review of the medical records and toxicology report

casting the jury’s verdict into doubt.

E

728, 979 P.2d at 130 (“to prove prejudice, a defendant must

probability that, but for the late disclosure, the

different”).

24

outcome 0f the

Johnson, 132 Idaho

show

trial

a reasonable

would have been

The

district court erred

in the late acquisition

amounted

by baselessly excluding consideration 0f trial counsel’s

of medical evidence and by basing

t0 only a claimed

role

prejudice analysis on What

its

need for additional investigation. The medical records and

toxicology reports were produced within a reasonable time 0f their request (the same day
as their receipt

by

the prosecution).

decision to not request the records 0r

to get the testimony

of the

The primary source of delay was

make

state’s expert

other efforts to obtain

them

trial

counsel’s

until after failing

The medical records and

witness excluded.

toxicology report were ultimately irrelevant and the evidence therein was inadmissible.

Application of the proper legal standards shows the

by denying

trial

court did not abuse

its

discretion

the requested continuance.

III.

The

District

Court Erroneouslv Found Dr. Groben’s Expert Testimony Based

On Medical

Records Inadmissible
A.

Introduction

Based 0n foundation that experts

0n medical records

in

in the particular

ﬁeld ofpathology reasonably rely

forming opinions, the magistrate held that Dr. Groben could

testify

about the facts 0r data he gleaned from his review 0f the Victim’s medical records.
(Exhibits, pp. 156-60 (Trial Tr., p. 328, L. 12

held that the

trial

— p.

346, L. 19).)

On appeal the district court

court erred, and that only a treating physician could have testiﬁed about

the Victim’s injuries.

(R., pp, 246-50.)

The

district court’s

applicable law in several respects, primarily in that
discretion standard of review and does not apply the

it

is

inconsistent with

does not employ an abuse of

most recent

rule of evidence. Application of the correct legal standards

25

opinion

iteration

of the applicable

shows n0 abuse of discretion

by

the

trial court,

and therefore demonstrates error by the

district court

on intermediate

appeal.

Standard

B.

Of Review

“This Court reviews challenges t0 a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse

0f discretion standard.” PeJrr, 134 Idaho

at 50,

995 P.2d

broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence.”

“Our

at 935.

testimony.”

(1

trial

Egbert

at 820.

W_eig1_e,

“Trial courts maintain

165 Idaho

at

487, 447 P.3d

courts have broad discretion in deciding Whether to admit expert

V.

Idaho State

Ins.

Fund, 125 Idaho 678, 680, 873 P.2d 1332, 1334

994).

When reviewing
test

for

an abuse of discretion the appellate court applies a four factor

of whether the lower court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)

acted Within the outer boundaries of

its

discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal

standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0
the exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

MV Fun Life,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187,

194 (20 1 8).

“On appeal 0f a decision rendered by a district court While

acting in

its

intermediate

appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.”

Recovery

Servs.,

appellate court

substantial

G“

at

reviews the

court (magistrate) record to determine whether there

trial

397, 336 P.3d at 804 (quotation marks omitted).

is

and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s ﬁndings of fact and whether

696 (quoting Losser, 145 Idaho

at

9

from those findings” and then afﬁrms 0r

reverses the district court based 0n that determination.

at

The

LLC, 157 Idaho

the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow

P.3d

Med.

Shepherd, 161 Idaho

672, 183 P.3d at 760).
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at 17,

383

The

C.

District

Court Erred

Trial Court’s Discretion

BV Failing To Recognize The Scope And Exercise Of The
To Admit Evidence Of The Facts And Data Relied Upon

By An Expert

An “expert may base
aware

an opinion 0n facts or data

that the expert has

0n such

0f.” I.R.E. 703. If an expert reasonably relies

facts

facts

and data “need not be admissible for the opinion

facts

and data relied 0n “would otherwise be inadmissible,” they

t0

and

been made

data, the underlying

be admitted.” I.R.E. 703.

may be

If the

disclosed to the

jury “only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially

outweighs their prejudicial effect.” I.R.E. 703. Thus, although a court must disallow an
expert from being a mere “conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible

evidence,” the court

makes

may

allow the expert t0 disclose the “contents 0f the sources”

it

the “required balancing determination.” State V. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 426-27,

224 P.3d 485, 493-94 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
happened

That balancing determination

in this case.

Dr.

that

if

Groben based

his opinion about the Victim’s cause

0f death 0n “facts 0r data”

he “had been made aware of’ by reviewing the medical records.

159-60 (Trial TL,

p.

340, L. 6

— p.

344, L. 17).)

for admission of information based

703” that disclosing

The

trial

(ﬂ Exhibits, pp.

court applied the “balancing test”

on hearsay and determined “under the language of rule

t0 the jury the facts

and data relied 0n by Dr. Groben, based 0n his

review 0f the medical records, was appropriate t0 “help the jury understand the cause of
death.” (Exhibits, pp. 157 (Trial Tr., p. 332, L. 13

L. 17

— p.

346, L. 19).)

The record thus

—

p.

333, L. 12), 160 (Trial Tr., p. 345,

establishes that the district court correctly perceived

the issue as one 0f discretion, acted Within the outer boundaries 0f

27

its

discretion, acted

consistently with the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available to

reached

its

decision

This case

is

by the

exercise 0f reason.

analogous t0 Smith

164, 443 P.3d 178 (2019).

“vocational

evaluation.

rehabilitation

at

I_d.

“‘entitled t0 rely

_,
upon

substantially outweighs

specialist’s analysis

_, 443 P.3d

at

specialist”

443 P.3d

relied

that

at 186.

The

prejudicial effect

999

0n an inadmissible psychological

referee concluded that the specialist

the report’” and that the

its

Special Indemnity Fund, 165 Idaho

V. Industrial

In that case the hearing referee received the analysis 0f a

C

such that the referee would rely on the
directly.

the referee relied only

ﬁrst concluded that the referee

on the

facts

and data as stated by the

was not using

specialist.

“weighed the report’s probative value against the possible prejudicial
that [the specialist] could rely

on

it

t0

make his

Li

at

_, 443 P.3d

effect

Groben gleaned from the medical

be disclosed to the jury. (Exhibits, pp. 157 (Trial

— p.

it

and determined

records against their prejudicial effect and determined Dr. Groben could rely on

333, L. 12), 160 (Trial T11, p. 345, L. 17

When

conclusions.” Li. Like the referee in Sm_ith,

court in this case weighed facts and data Dr.

that they could

the

because the record showed that

In addition, the referee “correctly applied Idaho Rule of Evidence 703”

trial

Li. at

186-87 (quotes ofreferee’s opinion).

specialist as a “conduit” to consider inadmissible evidence

the

was

“probative value 0f the report

based 0n the report, but would not rely on the report

The Idaho Supreme Court

at 190.

and

it,

Tr., p.

them and

332, L. 13

—

p.

346, L. 19).)

In reversing, the district court stated that Dr.

Groben “could not provide the

actual

medical cause of death himself” because his testimony was not based 0n a “foundation
establishing that the Victim

was

in

sound condition before the accident” and a “discussion

28

0n the

effects

pp. 247-487)

Dr.

of the Victim’s drug use,

The

district court

if any,

0n the physician’s course of treatment.”

reasoned that the

trial

Groben “was not using the medical records

(R.,

court erred under I.R.E. 702 because

own

as a resource for developing his

opinion on the medical cause of death” but was “referring t0 the medical records for the

medical cause of death.”

(R., pp. 248-49.)

This analysis

is

unsupported by the record and

the applicable legal standards.

The

district court’s analysis is directly

that the doctors at the hospital

“documented

contrary to the record. Dr. Groben testiﬁed

[the Victim’s] injuries,” but did not

the cause 0f death. (Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p. 342, L. 18

court’s analysis, premised

doctors had determined

record that

is

on the belief

was

that Dr.

343, L. 12).)

Groben was merely

the “medical cause of deat

directly contrary to Dr.

— p.

”

is

stating

at

7

This

latter

district

What other

Groben’s testimony. Rather than deferring t0 the

420-21, 224 P.3d at 487-88, the

clearly erroneous, factual ﬁndings.

The

based on a misreading 0f the

court’s factual ﬁndings underpinning the admission of evidence, as the

WLkins, 148 Idaho

determine

Because the

requirement was based 0n the

law required,

district court substituted its

district court’s decision is

district court’s

trial

own,

based on facts

medical expertise, acquired by

reading two articles in medical journals. (R., p. 247.) These medical journal articles were
not presented t0 the trial court nor are they in the appellate record. Matters outside the
appellate record “cannot be considered

0n appeal.” State V. Congdon, 96 Idaho 377, 377,
529 P.2d 773, 773 (1974).
also Harmston V. Agro-W., Inc., 111 Idaho 814, 821, 727
P.2d 1242, 1249 (Ct. App. 1986) (appellate review is “restricted t0 the record and may not
consider matters outside that record”). The district court’s appellate ruling is erroneous on
this basis alone. It should be noted that Dr. Groben directly addressed this issue at a pretrial hearing, testifying that the methamphetamine played n0 role in the refractory

E

hypertension (loss 0f blood pressure) the Victim suffered.

TL,

p. 86, L. 11

—

p. 90, L. 8).)

The

district court erred

expertise for the medical expertise in the record.
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(Exhibits, pp. 95-96 (4/23/19

When

it

substituted

its

medical

opposite of those established

by

the record, the district court erred in

its

appellate

determination.

The

district court’s analysis is also

based 0n an erroneous legal analysis.

applicable rule provides that otherwise inadmissible facts or data

The

may be disclosed “if their

probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.” I.R.E. 703.

The proper appellate standard ofreview is a four-step abuse

0f discretion analysis. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho
district court

recognize the

trial

at 863,

421 P.3d

At no point did the

court’s discretion t0 allow disclosure of the otherwise

inadmissible facts and data underlying Dr. Groben’s opinion,

effect

of that action against the potential for unfair prejudice.

did

apply the proper four step appellate review standard.

it

at 194.

upon balancing the probative
(R., pp. 246-50.)

At no point

(R., pp. 246-50.)

Thus, in

addition to misreading the record, the district court failed t0 apply the correct legal

standards.

The record shows

that that Dr.

Groben

relied

the Victim’s injuries and medical state at the time he

accident.

(Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p. 341, L. 21

(Trial Tr., p. 349, L. 14

—

p.

352, L. 11).)

He

on the medical records

was admitted

—

p.

to determine

to the hospital after the

343, L. 7);

ﬂ alﬂ

pp. 161-62

then determined Which injuries caused the

Victim’s death (the torn arteries in the pelvis) and classiﬁed the death as accidental.
(Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p. 343, Ls. 8-15);

353, L. 16).)

t0

It

was Within

the

trial

ﬂ alﬂ

p. 162, (Trial Tr., p.

352, L. 16

— p.

court’s discretion, applying the correct balancing test,

admit Dr. Groben’s testimony about the facts and data underlying his opinion that the

Victim bled to death as a result of torn arteries he suffered as a result 0f the accident.

3O

even

Finally,

is

if there

were

error the error

an incorrect ruling regarding evidence,

this

was harmless. Under

I.C.R. 52 “if there

Court Will grant relief 0n appeal only

error affects a substantial right of one 0fthe parties.” State V. Joy, 155 Idaho

276, 281 (2013) (quotation omitted).

E

State V. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327, 335,

error, the State

alﬂ WLkins, 148 Idaho

at

1, 6,

if the

304 P.3d

420, 224 P.3d

at

487;

372 P.3d 382, 390 (2016). “T0 establish harmless

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error

complained 0f did not

contribute t0 the verdict obtained.” Svelmoe, 160 Idaho at 335, 372 P.3d at 390 (quotation

marks omitted).

Even

if Dr.

Groben had not been allowed

forth in the medical records,

accident. Indeed, there is

to testify about the speciﬁc injuries set

he could have testiﬁed that the Victim died as a result of the

n0 other possible cause of the Victim’s death

set forth above, for there t0

have been an intervening causation

it

in this record.

would have

“an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.” Thompson, 164 Idaho
at

at

t0

As

have been

826, 436 P.3d

647 (quotation marks omitted). Here there was no evidence 0f such an occurrence. The

Victim did not die 0f a drug overdose, 0r an unrelated heart attack, 0r leukemia, or ninja
assassination.

t0 save

He was

taken to the hospital after the accident where doctors were unable

him because he had already

lost too

much

blood. His death

was

legally straight-

forward for purposes 0f this case, and any error in allowing Dr. Groben t0 recite the speciﬁc
injuries set forth in the

t0 death

medical records he reviewed before he opined that the Victim bled

because of the accident did not contribute to the verdict.
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CONCLUSION
The
the

state respectfully requests this

Court to reverse the

district court

and

reinstate

judgment of the magistrate.
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